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The tyranny of a prince in an oligarchy 
is not so dangerous to the public 
welfare as the apathy of a citizen in a 
democracy
Montesquieu
Acquiescence is the friend of illegality
Justice Roger Coventry
The first anniversary of Fiji’s December 
2006 coup passed uneventfully without any 
rallies, protest marches or vigils – there was 
merely the exhausted, inaudible mutter from 
the populace hankering for some semblance 
of normality to return.  A Fijian political activist 
once likened Fiji to a swimming duck: all 
calm on the surface but furiously churning 
underneath. Just how much turbulence 
there was among indigenous Fijians was 
difficult to gauge, but its existence was 
beyond doubt. To forestall any organised 
opposition, the interim administration slapped 
on several state of emergencies. Overall, 
2007 remained a depressing and miasmic 
year, with much movement but little change. 
The military’s much heralded ‘clean up’ 
campaign, the principal reason for the coup, 
was stalled, mired in controversy about its 
legal validity and true purpose. No one was 
successfully prosecuted for misdemeanours 
for which they had been unceremoniously 
sacked from office. The judiciary remained 
as divided and demoralised as ever. The 
constitution remained intact, but was often 
‘ignored or bypassed as deemed necessary.’1 
International vigilance remained, manifested 
in travel bans on members of the interim 
administration, despite official pleas for 
sympathetic understanding and assistance. 
Fundamental changes to the electoral 
system were mooted, including a common 
non-racial electoral roll, a common name 
for all citizens, and the reform of important 
institutions of indigenous governance. 
However, there was reservation among 
many who were already distrusting of the 
interim administration’s motives and its 
counterproductive confrontational approach 
to sensitive issues. The metaphor of a 
duck crossing apparently placid water 
accurately described Fiji as it marked the first 
anniversary of the country’s fourth coup.
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By the end of 2007, blatant breaches 
of human rights – people hauled up to the 
military barracks, interrogated and subjected 
to degrading treatment for alleged ‘inciteful’ 
activities or comments or unproven criminal 
activities – were for the most part over. 
However, the brutal police-military  assault in 
early November (2007) on Ballu Khan, a Fiji-
born, New  Zealand businessmen suspected 
of masterminding  an assassination plot 
targeting Commodore  Banimarama, Finance 
Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and Attorney 
General Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum, among 
others, showed just how tenuous the respect 
for law and order remained. People observed 
silence and self-censorship for good reason. 
Eleven suspects apprehended in the 
November 2007 incident, among them Ratu 
Inoke Takiveikata  (2000 coup convict and 
Naitasiri high chief), Metusela Mua (former 
Intelligence chief), and Jone Baleidrokadoka 
(former Land Forces Commander), continue 
to await trial. 
Whether the assassination plot was 
genuine or a ruse to detract attention from 
the interim administration’s own internal 
difficulties will be revealed in due course. 
Already the initial charge of treason has been 
reduced to conspiracy to murder, with one 
suspect freed due to lack of evidence. Police 
Commissioner Esala Teleni implausibly 
implicated un-named foreign governments 
(no doubt he had Australia and New Zealand 
in mind) and even some local, again 
un-named, non-government organisations 
in a ‘conspiracy and consolidated effort to 
disrupt the peaceful environment in Fiji.’2 
Yet again, there was no evidence.  Teleni’s 
assertion that Ballu Khan had suffered only 
‘minor injuries’ – when in fact Khan’s injuries 
were quite serious, including a fractured 
skull, broken ribs and other life-threatening 
internal injuries requiring month long intensive 
medical care –  served to underline the police 
commissioner’s brazen disregard for the 
truth, and was seemingly symptomatic of a 
larger malaise.
PEOPLES’ CHARTER
An important part of the interim 
administration’s plans for Fiji’s future was 
preparing the so-called Peoples’ Charter. 
The Charter’s goal is to ‘rebuild Fiji into 
a non-racial, culturally-vibrant and united, 
well-governed truly democratic nation that 
seeks progress and prosperity through merit-
based equality of opportunity and peace.’3 
The charter is being developed through the 
43-member National Council for Building a 
Better Fiji (NCBBF), which has created a 
number of committees  to examine issues 
of good governance; economic growth; 
social and cultural identity and nation 
building; the role of Fiji’s security forces in 
national development; enhancing livelihood, 
citizenship, and leadership; and institutional 
reform. President Josefa Iloilo launched 
the Charter project in October 2007 and 
appointed members of the Council in January. 
Archbishop Petero Mataca and the interim 
prime minister Commodore Bainimarama 
agreed to co-chair the NCBBF.  Predictably, 
their appointment provoked controversy. 
While Bainimarama’s selection was 
deemed by many to be politically necessary, 
as his support was crucial for the project’s 
success, it also politicised the process 
and impaired its neutrality in the public 
mind. It effectively ensured that his political 
opponents, to whom Bainimarama has shown 
little empathy, would boycott the Charter 
and the National Council for Building a 
Better Fiji (NCBBF). Bainimarama curiously 
expressed puzzlement at public scepticism 
towards his participation, little realising that 
he himself was the principal cause of it. John 
Samy, head of the NCBBF’s Technical and 
Support Secretariat, claimed that the Charter 
initiative was independent of the interim 
administration, but with Bainimarama as 
co-chair and several government ministers 
heading various National Council committees, 
this was unconvincing. As Daryl Tarte, chair 
of the Fiji Media Council, said in a letter in 
which he resigned his membership of the 
Council, ‘the process is clearly driven by the 
Interim government. It is not autonomous 
and is compromised.’4
Archbishop Mataca’s inclusion dismayed 
many Catholics opposed to the military 
coup and the interim regime, and others 
who decried the Catholic Church’s ‘silent 
understanding’ of the reasons behind the 
coup and its tacit moral support to its leaders.5 
Although Mataca is widely regarded as a man 
of complete integrity and unimpeachable 
character, and he promised not to be 
anybody’s rubber stamp, doubts remained 
about  his decision to co-chair the NCBBF. 
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‘By accepting the position [of co-chair],’ a 
Fiji Times editorial said, ‘the Archbishop has 
unwittingly given his approval to the coup, 
the usurpers and the interim government. 
Regardless of how noble his motives may 
have been in accepting the post, the public 
will always see him and the church in a 
different light now.’6
The controversy over Mataca’s 
appointment continues to simmer, although 
the Catholic Church, or at least some of its 
leaders (Fr Kevin Barr, for example), have 
from the outset taken an ‘ends justify the 
means,’  social justice line – rather than a legal 
justice line – placing faith in the possibility of 
a positive, genuine nation-building outcome 
from the military takeover.  ‘The legal/
illegal paradigm being pursued in Fiji today 
seems to be getting us nowhere,’ Barr has 
written, ‘It simply creates an endless cycle 
of negativity and stalemates. [A democratic 
society] cannot be built solely on the rule of 
law. It demands that the law be balanced by 
principles of social justice, compassion and 
common sense. It may not always be helpful 
to fight for the rigid application of the law.’7
The Charter has expectedly received 
mixed response from the people.  Two 
principal Hindu organisations, the Arya 
Pratinidhi Sabha and the Sanatan Dharam 
Pratinidhi Sabha, have supported it and 
agreed to participate in the deliberations of 
the National Council for Building a Better Fiji. 
However, with apparently little widespread 
consultation, if letters to the editors in the local 
press are anything to go by, there remains 
uncertainty of rank and file endorsement of 
the leadership’s decisions. Other Indo-Fijian 
religious and cultural organisations have 
refused to participate in the proceedings of 
the NCBBF. The Fiji Muslim League and 
Sangam (representing the South Indian 
community) are among them.  However, the 
endorsement by some Indo-Fijian cultural 
and social organisations, representing a 
large section of the community, sends yet 
another signal to those Fijians opposed to 
the coup that the Indo-Fijian community 
is silently (and sometimes not so silently) 
supporting the interim administration and 
benefitting from its policies. Yet, some of the 
most prominent critics of the coup (Shamima 
Ali, Imrana Jalal, Brij V Lal, Wadan Narsey, 
Richard Naidu) are also Indo-Fijians. 
All the talk about the Charter occurring 
in Suva means little in the countryside, 
where Indo-Fijians suffer from the effects 
of a seriously ailing sugar industry and 
the dislocation caused by the expiry of 
land leases. Making ends meet is becoming 
harder by the day, as prices of basic food 
items and fuel keep rising and employment 
opportunities diminish. But perceptions 
matter and acquire a reality of their own. 
When an interim minister, Labour’s Lekh 
Ram Vayeshnoi, calls the coup a ‘Godsend,’ 
when academic Sukh Dev Shah describes 
it as ‘divine intervention,’ and as Indo-Fijian 
gloating becomes more audible on radio talk-
back shows and in the letters to the papers, 
the indigenous Fijian perception about Indo-
Fijian support for the coup becomes easier to 
understand – and harder to ignore. 
Several Fijian provincial councils have also 
endorsed the Charter, including Cakaudrove 
and Kadavu, but this endorsement carries 
little weight. For instance, Cakaudrove’s 
endorsement of the Charter has been 
challenged by Ratu Naiqama, the Tui Cakau, 
the paramount chief of the province and a 
former minister in the Qarase government. A 
spokesman for the chiefly Lalagavesi clan of 
Cakaudrove, Epeli Matata, said emphatically 
that Ratu Naiqama and the whole province 
of Cakaudrove ‘is not supporting, has never 
and will never support, the work involved in 
the Peoples’ Charter.’8 Individuals from other 
provinces and regions have similarly offered 
strong contrary views, among them Kadavau, 
where Provincial Council chairman Ratu 
Josetaki Nawaloawalo’s enthusiastic support 
for the military takeover and subsequent 
events has been publicly challenged by 
people from his own province.9
Embroiling the provinces in the adoption 
(or rejection) of the Charter is politically 
fraught,  for no place is (or ever has been) 
of one mind on any political issue. Provinces 
don’t vote; people do. The power of chiefs to 
decide the destinies of their people, to be their 
sole spokesman and intermediaries with the 
outside, has long gone, as travel, technology, 
education, the effects of a competitive market 
economy and exposure to broader forces 
of change have altered the fabric of Fijian 
society. Over the last two decades or so, 
political fragmentation rather than political 
unity under chiefly leadership has been the 
order of the day in indigenous politics. In the 
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absence of strong, overarching leadership 
and a broader unifying vision, dissension 
among Fijians will only grow. Signs of this are 
everywhere. It would be wise for the provincial 
chiefs  to adopt a more neutral stance as 
facilitators of political discourse among their 
people rather than as its arbiters.
 
While some support the Charter 
opportunistically – rewarded, for example, by 
a government contract, an appointment to a 
statutory board, a rare opportunity to network, 
or a brief moment in the public limelight – 
there are also some who genuinely believe 
in the utopian future the Charter promises 
for Fiji. A genuine sense of frustration at the 
manner in which parliamentary democracy 
has been manipulated by the ruthless 
politics of race has led some academics and 
professionals, normally staunch supporters 
of parliamentary democracy and the rule 
of law, to endorse the shock therapy of the 
military coup.  They want the racial system 
of voting abolished, and see the preparation 
of the Charter as an opportunity to break the 
confining shackles of the past. Some believe 
it is necessary at times to go outside the law 
in order to preserve its spirit. 
There are others who have little regard for 
‘peoples’ democracy and support the Charter 
because, they say, people do not know 
what is in their own best interest and  they 
are their own worst enemies who invariably 
get manipulated by self-seeking politicians. 
Hence it is best to do their thinking for 
them, relieving them of the responsibility of 
making decisions for their future. According 
to this view, the Charter would put the 
nation’s affairs on the autopilot - every major 
issue of public policy would have been 
canvassed and its resolution provided for. 
Fundamental principles of good governance 
would underpin all future public activities of 
the nation. The elected parliament, when it 
finally eventuates, would make only minor 
adjustments to public policy. Politics of the 
usual type, with its rawness and vitality, would 
be removed from the process of governance. 
The fundamentals of good governance 
would be permanently entrenched in the 
public sphere, and politicians will become 
irrelevant. ‘Politics,’ for these people, is a 
‘dirty’ word that creates more problems than 
it resolves. ‘Revenge of the Nerds’ is how 
one colleague described this category of 
Charter supporters, meaning well-heeled 
bureaucrats, academics, international civil 
servants and the like. 
The Charter has strong critics as well.10 
The Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
(SDL), the Methodist Church and the Fijian 
Teachers Association, among many others, 
have opposed it and refused to participate 
in the deliberations of the National Council. 
Their reaction is unsurprising. They see 
the Charter as an attempt by the military 
to emasculate the SDL party and exclude 
people like Laisenia Qarase from standing for 
office in the future. They also see the Charter 
as neither a part of the constitution nor an Act 
of parliament. How, then, could the document 
be used to deprive people of their basic 
constitutional rights? Given Bainimarama’s 
uncompromising stance and vehemence, 
Qarase is right to be cautious, justifiably feeling 
that the military intends to use the Charter as 
a blunt, coercive instrument to bludgeon him 
and his supporters into acquiescence—or, 
worse, political extinction. 
Fijian nationalists oppose the Charter 
because they see the document as diluting 
their privileged place in national life. They 
want a Fiji where Fijian aspirations and 
interests are respected and accorded 
primacy, not subordinated to the interests 
of others. For them, that is the right and 
proper thing to do. This, after all, was what 
their leaders, from Ratu Lala Sukuna to Ratu 
Mara, had told them all along, their vision 
endorsed by the departing colonial masters.11 
The interim administration’s forceful rhetoric 
of non-racialism stirs their suspicion and 
stokes the embers of ethnic chauvinism, as 
does its efforts to reform Fijian institutions, 
long cherished as the guardians of the Fijian 
interest, such as the Native Land Trust Board 
and the Great Council of Chiefs. The fact that 
many Fijians see Mahendra Chaudhry as 
the ‘man running the government,’ calling ‘all 
the shots,’ with Bainimarama being a mere 
figurehead, adds a particular dimension to 
the distressing drama.12  One highly mobile 
and educated Fijian lady put the issue this 
way: ‘It is okay to criticise individual Fijian 
chiefs who are corrupt or morally bankrupt. I 
do it all the time myself. But when you attack 
Fijian institutions, then my heart begins to 
hurt. They are a part of our cultural identity. 
That is what makes us what we are.’ I suspect 
that her sentiments are widely shared by 
many other indigenous Fijians.
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There are others whose opposition to 
the Charter is ideological. For them the 
constitution is, and should always be, the 
supreme law of the land. They see the 
Charter as a way for the military to supersede 
the constitution, rendering it a toothless tiger 
or, to change the metaphor, a hollow vessel 
to be filled with whatever ideology the military 
wants. The affairs of the nation, they say, 
should be run by an elected parliament, the 
supreme repository of the peoples’ freely 
exercised choice, not by unelected people 
serving in an illegal regime. The real problem 
for Fiji, they argue, is not the absence of a 
Charter defining the principles and purposes 
of governance – the Compact in the 1997 
Constitution (chapter 2) already provides for 
these. Rather, they view as the real problem 
a lack of respect for the rule of law and the 
verdict of the ballot box, of which the military 
is the principal culprit. 
A Charter, however well intentioned, will 
not eradicate the deepening coup culture in 
Fiji or eliminate the troubling disrespect for 
the rule of law. Today, it is a commodore’s 
charter; tomorrow it could be another 
colonel’s political agenda. Former land forces 
commander, Colonel Meli Saubulinayau, 
who resigned from the military in 2007 after 
a botched effort to replace Bainimarama as 
head of the military force, has expressed 
a widely held view that Fiji does ‘not need 
another piece of paper as we already have 
one that talks about the law and what is legal. 
If you want to stop the coup culture, then you 
need people who have a spirit that wants to 
stay within the boundaries of the law.’13 Fiji’s 
coup culture can end only if the military, and 
especially its commander, decide to end it.
People are being asked to endorse a 
document which will profoundly affect their 
lives, but in whose formulation they have 
had only a perfunctory say. The hand-picked 
drafters of the Charter and the military have 
already made up their minds about what the 
Charter’s content and parameters would 
be – Bainimarama’s railings against Qarase 
are proof enough of that.  Normally in a 
democratic society, a document such as the 
Charter would have been formulated after 
an extended period of consultation with the 
public, not before it. The interim administration 
has promised a national referendum on the 
Charter – but this is easier said than done. 
Referendum on controversial, divisive 
issues hardly ever succeed. A near consensus 
would have to be reached among the major 
stakeholders if it is to have any realistic 
prospect of success. With all the major 
players poles apart, it is almost certain that 
a referendum on the Charter will fail if there 
is a meaningful threshold for its successful 
passage. What is not sufficiently appreciated 
in Fiji is that a failed referendum will be worse 
than no referendum at all, closing off doors to 
further conversation which might otherwise 
have remained open. Referendum, in truth, 
is a risky proposition even at the best of 
times. A Fiji Daily Post editorial summed up 
the Charter conundrum well: ‘The danger of 
asserting one-sided settlements is evident 
in that great chain of events that led to the 
rise of nuclear warfare at the end of WW II. 
By the same principle, a one-sided ‘People’s 
Charter’ for Fiji may not have the ameliorative 
effect its enforcers hope for. To truly succeed, 
the charter, like the nation, must proceed 
by bipartisan agreements, by consultative 
dialogue that brings victors and vanquished 
to the table of compromise so that a just 
settlement is achieved.’14
THE MILITARY
The military has assumed the role of 
guardian and facilitator of the Charter. At first 
there was no discussion about the role of 
the military in Fiji’s future. As Inspector Nasir 
Ali remarked in another context, touching 
the military (i.e. investigating corruption in 
the military) would be ‘suicidal.’ Following 
public comment, one of the working groups 
of the NCBBF has promised to look at the 
‘role of Fiji’s security forces, including the 
military, in national development’.15  However, 
‘looking’ is more likely to end up entrenching 
the military in the public-political sphere 
and enhancing its ‘national’ developmental 
role. Meanwhile, the military marches on 
undaunted. Since the December 2006 coup, 
it has hardened its grip on the most important 
levers of power. Commodore Esala Teleni 
heads the police force, Colonel Iowane 
Naivalarua is Commissioner of Prisons, and 
Captain Viliame Naipoto is Commissioner 
of Immigration. Several others have been 
placed in strategic positions in the civil 
service and in district administration. All this 
may not be tantamount to the ‘militarisation’ 
of the civil service in the conventional sense, 
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but it does corrode its morale while causing 
a ‘clash of cultures’ between the military 
personnel transferred to the civil service 
and those who have come from a civilian 
background.16 
Respect for the established rules and 
procedures of public service are flouted 
with impunity because the protocols that 
govern the conduct of military operations do 
not always accord with those that regulate 
public service. And this, said the Fiji Times, is 
‘something known to be worrying many officers 
who have fought for years to lift the standard 
of the force.’17 Former military spokesmen 
Lieutenant Colonel Mosese Tikoitoga has 
said that the ‘Military Council was of the view 
that there needs to be more involvement of 
officers in the civil service because those 
who were there were not producing results 
and not doing their jobs. The attitude of the 
civil service needs to be changed and those 
that didn’t change should move on or be 
removed.’18 The monitoring and assessment 
of the performance of the civil service is, or 
should be, the responsibility of the Public 
Service Commission, not the military, which 
itself remains curiously unaccountable to all 
except itself. 
The checkpoints and the military patrols 
of the streets are gone, but the military’s 
grip on the country has strengthened. There 
is a Military Council, comprising senior 
officers (both presently serving and former 
officers) who sit in on cabinet meetings and 
make recommendations to Bainimarama on 
the performance of ministers and on other 
matters of importance. The Council has 
no legal foundation, and its existence was 
revealed accidentally to the wider public late 
in the year. But of its powerful advisory role 
there is no doubt. Bainimarama has vested 
the executive authority of the country in the 
Military Council – precisely how and when 
this was done remains a mystery. 
The early hope among some members of 
the deposed government of fomenting dissent 
in the ranks of the military has long vanished. 
Bainimarama’s hold on the loyalty of his 
troops seems complete and unshakeable, 
despite occasional talk of restiveness in the 
ranks and the distant prospect of an uprising 
against him. He is the paramount chief of their 
vanua, which is the military. He is solicitous 
of the welfare of those under his command. 
The military intends for itself a permanent 
and visible presence in national life. The 
military, Captain Viliame Naipoto has said, 
‘is my answer to killing the coup culture.’19 It 
is a thought filled with profound implications 
for the future of Fijian politics: putting the 
colonels and commodores in charge of the 
nation to prevent future coups. Disbanding 
the military or, at least, substantially reducing 
its size and operational role is probably too 
subversive a thought – ‘inciteful,’ to use a 
currently fashionable word.   If the military 
remains adamant about its increased and 
more visible role in the affairs of the state, 
then we may have seen the last of the 
Westminster type civilian democracy in Fiji.
ELECTIONS
Will elections be held in the early part of 
2009?20 This is an undertaking the interim 
administration gave to the Forum Secretariat 
in March 2007 and which Bainimarama 
affirmed at the Forum leaders meeting 
in Nukualofa in mid-October 2007.21 An 
early election is doubtful, as the interim 
administration has shown no enthusiastic 
commitment to putting in place the electoral 
infrastructure for holding early elections. 
Focused principally on the Peoples’ Charter, 
its public utterances on the subject are at 
odds with the reality on the ground. The Fiji 
Labour Party has opposed early elections, 
with Chaudhry saying that ‘general elections 
will be held when the necessary groundwork 
is complete.’22 Precisely what these words 
imply is difficult to decipher – what constitutes 
necessary groundwork, according to whom, 
and for what precise purpose? – but the 
intention to delay is unmistakable. 
In a meeting with Indian officials in 
New Delhi, Chaudhry is reported to have 
mentioned June 2010 as the possible date 
for the next elections,23  echoing the date 
Bainimarama had mentioned in one of his 
early addresses soon after taking power. 
As the year ended, the Military Council was 
adamant that the elections would be held 
only when the People’s Charter had been 
accepted. This also became Chaudhry’s 
mantra. ‘The charter,’ he said, ‘should be 
put together first before the election because 
we need to address many problems we are 
facing in this nation. We have to address 
problems  and  put  our  fundamentals right 
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before an election is held.’24  Once again, what 
constitutes ‘fundamentals’ and according 
to whose definition remains unclear. With 
widespread disagreement in the community 
over the Charter, consensus is unlikely to be 
reached and the election is therefore likely to 
be delayed. The interim administration has 
promised to finalise the Charter by the end 
of 2008 but, at the present pace of progress, 
that is unlikely to be achieved.
The consequences of not holding elections 
within a prescribed timeframe will be severe 
for Fiji. The European Union is unlikely to 
release funds to help restructure the ailing 
sugar industry. Travel bans will remain in 
place, leaving the vital tourism sector in 
the doldrums. And race relations, already 
severely strained, will harden even further. 
Reconciliation, if and when it comes, will be 
more difficult to achieve because emotions 
are deeply roused about who was, and was 
not, behind the coup and the events that 
have followed. Chaudhry’s election-delaying 
position is understandable from a purely 
pragmatic, self-serving political stance: why 
hold elections when you are already in power 
and enjoying its fruit (with the backing of 
guns no less), without being accountable to 
anyone? But it is also a short sighted view, 
a Pyrrhic victory, and provocative in the 
extreme to those deposed from power by 
military force. 
People in power in the Fiji Labour 
Party–Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
interim administration appear seemingly 
unconcerned about the incontrovertible fact 
that a large cross section of the indigenous 
Fijian community feels hobbled and deeply 
humiliated. They are the outright majority of 
the population, they said, underprivileged 
ones who needed special assistance, who 
as the taukei, the indigenous inhabitants, 
were ‘by right’ entitled to control the levers 
of power. And now this: unceremoniously 
tossed out of office, deprived of government 
handouts, and told to compete on equal 
terms with everyone else. The days of state-
sanctioned pampering are over. 
It is a timely, if severe, message relayed 
with unprecedented bluntness. If the SDL 
and the nationalists ever return to power, 
they would likely pursue an ethno-nationalist 
agenda with a vengeance never seen before 
in Fijian politics. It will be the politics of 
grudge and relentless score-settling all over 
again. This is a fear that lies deep at the 
back of the Indo-Fijian mind. This is the 
main reason why so many are desperate 
for the military to succeed in its campaign. 
For, if it fails, Indo-Fijians know they will be 
doomed permanently to a subordinate future 
in the cul-de-sac of Fijian politics from which 
escape will be difficult to orchestrate.
THE ROCKY ROAD
Early in January 2008, Bainimarama 
reshuffled his cabinet, a full month after he 
had indicated his desire to do so, demanding 
more stringent performance from his 
ministers, some of whom, as the Fiji Sun 
noted, were ‘notable failures’ and some who 
saw ‘their appointments as opportunities to 
serve themselves and their political cronies 
rather than their nation while others have 
been inactive to the point of invisibility.’25 
Four new faces joined the interim line-up: 
Dr Jiko Luveni, a close relative of Labour 
party president Jokapeci Koroi; Filipe Bole, 
unsuccessful National Alliance candidate in 
the 2006 elections (who, curiously, suggested 
that those opposing the Peoples’ Charter 
should leave Fiji, which would include a 
majority of the indigenous community!); a 
naval officer, Captain Lesi Natuva; and former 
Labour senator Tom Ricketts. 
The new line-up revealed the true identity 
of the interim cabinet. Fiji Labour Party 
and the National Alliance had members 
who controlled many of the most important 
portfolios: Finance, National Planning, Sugar 
Industry and Public Utilities (Chaudhry, FLP); 
Labour, Industrial Relations, Employment, 
Local Government, Urban Development 
and Housing (Vayeshnoi, FLP); Trade, 
Tourism and Communications (Ricketts, 
FLP); Education, National Heritage, Culture 
and Arts, Youth and Sports (Bole, Alliance); 
Defence, National Security and Immigration 
(Ratu Epeli Ganilau, Alliance); and Primary 
Industries (Alliance leaning Jo Cokanasiga). 
It is an impressive haul by any measure, 
making clear where power lies in Fiji and 
why Chaudhry is ever so reluctant to hold 
early elections. Those who were dumped 
from the interim administration were promptly 
rewarded with appointments to the Public 
Accounts Committee (Transport Minister 
Manu Korovulavula, Minister for Women’s 
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Affairs Laufitu Malani, Agriculture Minister 
Jainend Kumar).  Taito Waradi, the sacked 
Commerce Minister, was appointed chairman 
of the Fiji Development Bank. In this revolving-
door politics, no one really lost out. It was a 
familiar pattern from the past and for which 
the Qarase government has paid a heavy 
price. 
The ‘clean-up’ campaign, the crucial 
raison d’être for the coup, has for all practical 
purposes stalled. Without any credible 
evidence of wrongdoing unearthed even 
after the most intensive searches26 or any 
successful prosecutions taking place, it is 
possible to rethink whether any wrong doings 
occurred in the first place, or whether it was a 
case of politically motivated suspicions about 
the political loyalties and personal agendas of 
those targeted. The legal foundations of the Fiji 
Independent Commission Against Corruption 
have been questioned.27  Launched with great 
expectations, it has been unable to deliver in 
a satisfactory manner. It remains without a 
chair after Malaysian lawyer and president 
of LAWASIA, Mah Weng Kwai, declined the 
appointment due to considerable pressure 
from the legal fraternity in Fiji, after having 
initially accepting it. 
The tribunal to investigate the charges 
against the Chief Justice, Daniel Fatiaki, was 
appointed almost a year after he was sent on 
enforced leave (on full pay).28 The division in 
the judiciary remains, and the public perception 
of its independence is impaired, despite the 
Acting Chief Justice Anthony Gates assertion 
to the contrary.29  In June 2007, the Fiji 
Indigenous Lawyers Association President 
Samuela Matawalu, called for the immediate 
resignation of Justice Gates, viewing his 
appointment ‘with disdain’ because it came 
about ‘as a result of a conspiracy to remove 
the constitutionally appointed incumbent.’30 
Judges critical of post-coup developments 
and the patent illegality of some of these 
subsequent activities have resigned. They 
include Justice Gordon Ward, President of 
the Court of Appeal, and High Court Judge 
Roger Coventry.  ‘I have been concerned with 
the speed with which cases of fundamental 
importance are progressing’, Coventry told 
his farewell audience in January 2008. ‘I 
am concerned that acts, which on their face 
appear to be unlawful, are being presumed 
lawful until the court rules otherwise. I am 
concerned that in circumstance that require a 
judge or judges to take a particular course of 
action, that course is not being taken.’31
The resignation of the entire panel of 
the Fiji Court of Appeal was a matter of 
grave concern. Jurists from Australia and 
New Zealand have refused to serve on the 
Fiji courts, leading the Attorney General to 
look further afield to Southeast Asia, India 
and Africa, but so far without success. Two 
judges from Malaysia appointed to the Court 
of Appeal last year have yet to take their 
oath of office, and may even refuse to do 
so. Meanwhile, judges from the High Court, 
with limited experience on the bench – some 
as little as a year – are sitting on the Court 
of Appeal and the tenure of some judges 
who have long gone past the retiring age 
has been extended. The ‘stacking’ of the 
Appeal Court is a matter of grave concern 
to the legal fraternity in Fiji. So, too, is the 
injudicious manner in which some judges 
make comments on controversial political 
issues.32 The Fiji Law Society has refused 
to recognise judges appointed since the 
December 5, 2006 coup because it believes 
that the appointments were in breach of 
the constitution. Judicial appointments are 
made by the Judicial Service Commission, 
of which the president of the Fiji Law Society 
(FLS) is a permanent member. However, the 
appointments made last year were made 
without the FLS president’s presence or 
participation.33
The Attorney General, Aiyaz Sayed-
Khayium, embarrassed both the office 
of the President as well as the interim 
administration through flawed legal advice. 
He recommended the appointment of Adi 
Koila Mara as chair of the Constituency 
Boundaries Commission when she was 
clearly ineligible due to her former role as 
a Great Council of Chiefs nominee in the 
Senate. In order to avoid conflict of interest, 
Section 77 of the constitution prohibits 
appointment to the Commission of anyone 
who has been a member of parliament, or of 
a local authority or any other representative 
body prescribed by the parliament during the 
immediately preceding four years.  Perhaps 
a more grievous error was the breach of 
section 76 of the constitution, which 
authorises the President (not the Attorney 
General) to appoint the chairperson of the 
Boundaries Commission  acting in his own 
deliberate judgment, following consultation 
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with the prime minister and the leader of the 
opposition.  Khaiyum took it upon himself to 
apologize for the inappropriate advice to the 
president.
But it was not his advice to give in the 
first place, for the Attorney General is the 
chief legal advisor to the government  His is 
a political appointment. The Head of State 
seeks legal advice from the Chief Justice 
or other senior members of the judiciary. 
The Attorney General had quite clearly 
crossed the line.  Two conclusions can be 
drawn: either Bainimarama neglected his 
constitutional role, or the Attorney General 
usurped it. Either way, it reflected poorly on the 
administration. But mistakes did not matter, 
or were routinely ignored: as a reward for 
loyalty and brazen outspokenness in defence 
of the interim administration, Khaiyum had his 
portfolios expanded in the January reshuffle 
to include Public Enterprises. In February 
2008, he gained added negative publicity 
for preventing members of the International 
Bar Association from entering the country to 
look at the functioning of the judiciary in Fiji, 
claiming that the timing was inappropriate as 
a number of important constitutional cases 
were before the courts.
The most embarrassing episode to date 
in the short life of the interim administration 
without doubt was the revelations about 
Mahendra Chaudhry’s irregular tax affairs. 
Oxford-base political commentator and former 
Fiji journalist Victor Lal had been publishing 
a series of articles about Chaudhry’s tax 
affairs in the Fiji Sun without naming him. 
When in February 2008, Chaudhry dared 
the local journalists to name the errant, 
tax-evading minister, the Fiji Times did 
precisely that.34  Among the revelations was 
the non-disclosure to Fiji tax authorities of 
bank accounts Chaudhry held in Australia 
and New Zealand, which over time had 
accumulated over $1.6 million. He paid tax 
on interest earned only after the Fiji Islands 
Revenue and Customs Authority discovered 
the deposits under a bilateral tax treaty. 
Bainimarama refused calls for Chaudhry to 
resign or step aside, as urged by the Military 
Council, or to have FIRCA officials working 
on the case (who had by then been either 
removed or sent on leave) complete their 
investigation. ‘The issue with Mr Chaudhry 
is just between him and myself and no one 
else,’ he said.35
An investigative committee with narrow 
terms of reference, hastily and secretly 
organised by the Attorney General, cleared 
Chaudhry of any breach of the Fiji Tax Act, 
but many questions remained unanswered. 
It was revealed that large sums of money 
deposited in Chaudhry’s Australian accounts 
came from India and were channelled 
through the Indian Consulate in Sydney. 
The papers indicated that the money was 
a personal gift to Chaudhry, to enable him 
to settle in Australia because his life was 
in danger in Fiji, but Chaudhry had claimed 
that the money was being held in trust for 
his community. The FIRCA officials found no 
deed of trust or any other such document. 
Chaudhry claimed in January 2003 he had 
not received any money from India, although 
documents showed that it was already in 
his account in Australia.36  In December 
2005, Chaudhry, in response to questions 
from then Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, 
categorically denied receiving money from 
India, indicating that people in the Indian 
state of Haryana had raised money in his 
name to ‘assist with the struggle of the people 
of Indian origin here.’37 And so it went.
Chaudhry’s opponents gleefully surmised 
that the tax saga would finally sink his 
career.38 That is unlikely, though some 
former Labour party members have publicly 
criticised their leader for his participation 
in the military’s interim administration.39 
The critics were peremptorily sacked from 
the party. Chaudhry’s hold on the sugar 
belt remains strong. He has put his loyal 
supporters in important positions in the sugar 
industry. He is the Minister for Sugar as well 
as the General Secretary of the National 
Farmers Union (NFU).  He has refused 
to resign as the General Secretary of the 
NFU, despite the appearance of a conflict 
of interest – he is, as the Minister for Sugar 
and General Secretary of the NFU, both the 
defence attorney as well as the presiding 
judge. The saga has dimmed his reputation 
and tarnished his image as a clean crusader 
for good governance, and has muddied the 
high moral ground he has always claimed for 
himself and his causes. Mahendra Chaudhry 
will likely be remembered in future as much 
for the courage and tenacity he has shown 
in his long and turbulent political career and 
the sacrifices he has made and the hardships 
suffered, as for his sad, sorry tax saga.
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If Chaudhry was one casualty of the 
sordid tax affair, another was the Fiji media, 
in particular the publisher of the Fiji Sun, 
whose newspaper had broken the story in the 
first instance. Russell Hunter was summarily 
deported under the cover of darkness in late 
February 2008 by the interim administration 
for apparently violating the conditions of his 
work visa and because he was a threat to 
‘national security,’ however broadly that was 
defined.  Precisely what the visa conditions 
were or what ‘credible evidence’ of Hunter’s 
wrong doing the interim administration 
had were never divulged to the public.40 
More troubling was the state’s defiance 
of a High Court order prohibiting Hunter’s 
expulsion.41 A hastily introduced amendment 
to the Immigration Act made the Minister of 
Immigration’s decision unchallengeable in 
the courts. A few weeks later, the publisher of 
the Fiji Times, Evan Hannah, was summoned 
to ‘meet’ Attorney General Khaiyum about 
the coverage his paper gave to the affairs of 
the interim administration. 
Hunter’s deportation and perceptions of 
intimidation of the media brought much local 
as well as international criticism to the interim 
administration. Chaudhry has also floated 
the idea of licensing the media along the 
Singaporean model, a curiously incongruous 
proposition coming from the leader of a 
labour party which professes to champion 
the cause of democracy. At the same time, 
the widely criticised, angry and rambling 
report on the media in Fiji sponsored by the 
Fiji Human Rights Commission also made 
recommendations whose net effect would 
be further muzzling of the media.42  As the 
interim administration struggles to provide 
a semblance of stability to the country, the 
media will continue to be blamed for all 
manner of things, inducing a degree of 
self-censorship and fear of intimidation and 
infringing its rights and responsibilities as the 
Fourth Estate.
When Bainimarama executed his coup, 
he expected the international community 
to support his ‘clean up’ campaign. 
Labour Party’s participation in the interim 
administration also encouraged that thought. 
But the coup makers underestimated the 
response of the international community. At 
a private meeting with local businessmen, 
Commodore Bainimarama was reportedly 
told that international resolve against the 
coup would be short-lived, weakening after 
about six months, whereupon normalcy 
would swiftly return, following the pattern of 
earlier coups. Clearly that has not happened, 
nor is it likely to anytime soon. The election of 
the Rudd Labor government in Australia was 
touted by some in the interim administration, 
including Mahendra Chaudhry, as heralding 
the possibility of more understanding and 
dialogue between the two countries, leading 
hopefully to the relaxation of the travel bans 
on members of the interim administration. 
That   eventuality is hardly likely and would 
be politically unwise, contradicting Australia’s 
long-held position on the importance of 
democratic rule in the region and beyond. 
Winning power through a democratic election 
after eleven years in the wilderness, a Labour 
government could scarcely be expected to 
support a regime that had seized power 
through a military coup. Moreover, Australia 
formulates its policy on Fiji in consultation 
with its neighbours and allies, especially 
New Zealand (whose anti-coup stance is 
longstanding), the European Union and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat. Labor’s pre-
election stance on Fiji was clear: ‘The illegal 
seizing of power by Commodore Bainimarama 
remains an affront to democracy and justice.’43 
Labor leader Kevin Rudd was equally blunt: 
‘Democracy and the rule of law must prevail 
throughout the South Pacific region, so to 
see both stamped on by the military in Fiji 
is acutely unwelcome.44 How, in the face of 
these unequivocal declarations, the interim 
regime could expect cordiality from Australia 
defies credulity. Perhaps this was Fiji politics 
as usual again, words spoken for a gullible 
public’s consumption, but not intended to be 
taken seriously.
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Early in 2007, the Director of the Fiji Human 
Rights Commission, Dr Shaista Shameem, 
gained considerable notoriety both in Fiji and 
overseas for her enthusiastic endorsement of 
the December coup, which brought her into a 
sharp verbal exchange with Shamima Ali, one 
of the Human Rights Commissioners, and 
the Fiji legal fraternity generally. In her earlier 
report, Shameem had effectively blamed the 
Qarase government for causing the coup, 
holding it responsible for blatant abuse of 
human rights and launching a programme 
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of ‘ethnic cleansing.’  She issued a second 
‘investigative’ report on the coup in August 
2007, claiming that the military takeover 
on 5 December 2006 was not a coup. It 
was, instead, a constitutional removal of a 
corrupt, human rights-breaching government 
by the Head of State who was exercising 
powers conferred upon him by section 86 
of the constitution: ‘The President is the 
Head of the State and symbolises the unity 
of the State.’ The section, she contended, 
gave the president far-ranging ‘sovereign 
prerogative powers’ which he could exercise 
constitutionally at   his discretion for the good 
of the state.45 
Shameem’s ‘eccentric legal interpretation,’ 
as her critics put it, justifying the coup was 
seriously flawed and largely disregarded. The 
simple fact is that under the 1997 constitution 
the executive does not enjoy unrestricted 
power. He or she acts on the advice of 
the prime minister or cabinet except for 
‘very limited situations where he or she has 
discretion.’46 The executive’s reserve powers 
are carefully prescribed and circumscribed. 
The limiting of the sovereign’s power has 
been the thrust of constitutional development 
since the 18th century, when the concept of 
‘divine right to rule’ began to be reined in. A 
coup by any other name is still a coup, and 
by attempting to veil the 2006 coup as merely 
a constitutional removal of a government is, 
on the face of it,  simply too inventive to take 
seriously.47 
Not content with seeking to remove the 
legal legitimacy of the Qarase government, 
Dr Shameem authorised an enquiry into the 
fairness and validity of the 2006 elections. 
Predictably, the three-person enquiry chaired 
by local lawyer GP Lala, and largely boycotted 
or ignored by all except by the Fiji Labour Party, 
found minor discrepancies in the counting 
of ballot boxes and some irregularities in 
the registration of voters which particularly 
disadvantaged Indo-Fijians. But most people 
in Fiji believed, as the international election 
observers had certified, that there was no 
massive rigging of the election, that the 
whole exercise was a politically motivated 
affair designed to embarrass the Qarase 
government and to provide a thread of 
legitimacy to the interim administration. 
There was room for improvement in the 
administrative arrangements, to be sure, 
but the final outcome would not have been 
affected. Still, politically inspired rumours of 
rigging persist and have become a part of 
Fiji’s political culture, raising doubts in the 
public mind about the legitimacy of election 
outcomes.   
As the year ended, the ever combative 
Dr Shameem launched an enquiry into 
funding of the Duavata Initiative Limited, 
the commercial arm of the SDL Party. She 
was concerned about the manner in which 
the Initiative had solicited funds from donors 
before the elections. The Duavata Initiative is 
a private limited liability company registered 
under the Companies Act, legally entitled to 
solicit funds and pay tax on its generated 
income. The company is not required under 
Fiji laws to reveal its audited accounts, 
unlike a statutory organisation such as 
the Native Land Trust Board or the Fiji 
Sugar Corporation.  That the FHRC should 
undertake such an enquiry seemed to be 
yet another politically-motivated initiative, 
raising further suspicions among indigenous 
Fijians, the overwhelming majority of whom 
support the SDL. A question to be asked is 
whether it is an appropriate use of public 
money to have an enquiry into the fund 
raising activities of a private company when 
genuine abuse of human rights (the assault 
of Ballu Khan, the deaths of civilians in police 
or military custody) go un-investigated.
On March 31, 2008, the Human Rights 
Commission issued yet another ‘Special 
Investigations Report,’ this time on an alleged 
Australian intervention in Fiji immediately 
before the December 2006 coup. It claimed 
that Australia was in breach of international 
law when it sought to influence events in Fiji 
by sending in SAS personnel and despatching 
warships before the coup – ostensibly to 
evacuate Australian citizens, when in truth the 
motives were more sinister – and, in concert 
with other countries, by trying to incite mutiny 
within the ranks of the Fiji Military Forces 
against Commodore Bainimarama (who was 
then in New Zealand). The report provides a 
chronology of events leading up to the coup. 
Australia has predictably rejected any 
ulterior motives other than the safe evacuation 
of its citizens in the state of emergency.48 
The Human Rights Commission’s allegations 
are akin to those levelled against the 
United States in the 1987 coup.49 What the 
actual truth is may never be known: such 
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allegations are easier to make than to prove. 
In this case, Dr Shameem had gone on a 
‘fishing expedition,’ seeking explanations, 
drawing attention to omissions of factual 
information concerning certain episodes and 
events, and highlighting contradictions in 
official responses.  However, there are no 
‘direct hits,’ so to speak, no concrete proof of 
Australia’s intention to intervene militarily in 
Fiji. And there the matter rests. One thing is 
clear: the report is not taken seriously even by 
neutral observers because of Dr Shameem’s 
close identification with, and support for, the 
coup and the interim administration. This, we 
can be rest assured, is not the last report that 
will emanate from the fecund pen (or word 
processor) of the Director of the Fiji Human 
Rights Commission.
ROAD MAP
As 2007 unfolded, the interim 
administration, grappling with the niggling 
problems of running a country amidst 
diminishing opportunities and sullen 
opposition, subtly changed the tune about 
its purpose. The military’s rationale for the 
coup had been the removal of corruption 
and the promotion of good transparent 
governance; however, this was now hobbled. 
The promise in the ‘Road Map for the Return 
to Parliamentary Democracy’ issued in 
February 2007 to ‘introduce measures to 
kick-start the national economy’ remained 
unrealised.50 So, too, was the promise to 
‘resolve the land-lease issue,’ and ‘create 
more jobs for our people, provide them 
with better income and opportunities, and 
reduce poverty.’ Instead, twelve months later, 
poverty was on the rise, squatter settlements 
were mushrooming, violent urban crime was 
a serious concern, the tourism industry was 
down, and unemployment was rising.51 The 
rhetoric of change and betterment could 
not hide the grim reality of despair on the 
ground.
But Bainimarama remained unperturbed, 
seemingly oblivious to the many unresolved 
problems swirling around him. Indeed, one of 
the more fascinating developments of 2007 
in Fiji was the growing ease and confidence 
– arrogance in the view of his critics – with 
which he was getting accustomed to and 
enjoying his power. He attended the Forum 
Leaders meeting in Tonga and addressed 
the 62 Session of the UN General Assembly 
in late September. There, he continued to 
present himself as a selfless servant of 
his nation, a reluctant warrior who only 
entered the fray at the last minute to save 
his nation. He characterized a disintegrating 
Fiji under Laisenia Qarase, experiencing 
‘a pervasive increase in corruption; serious 
economic decline combined with fiscal 
mismanagement; a sharp deterioration in the 
law and order situation; and deepening of 
the racial divide in the country.’ That was not 
all. ‘The convicted coup perpetrators were 
prematurely discharged from prison, and 
certain coup perpetrators and sympathisers 
were appointed as senior government 
ministers and officials. There were also a 
series of legislations (sic) that were deeply 
divisive and overtly racist.52 This simplified 
and self-serving rendition of events needs 
little comment. But this was the message that 
the military and the interim government strove 
to propagate, often, to their puzzlement, to 
unreceptive and unresponsive audiences.
In February 2008, Bainimarama appointed 
himself chairman of the Great Council of 
Chiefs (GCC), thereby becoming the most 
powerful man in modern Fijian history – 
head of the military, the government and the 
supreme body of the indigenous community. 
As chair of the GCC, Bainimarama will 
appoint, theoretically on the advice of the 
provincial councils, 52 members of the 
Council. He could ‘suspend, discipline or 
dismiss any member who brings disrepute to 
the Council.’ No Fijian, chief or otherwise, will 
be eligible for the membership of the Council 
if he or she has served a prison term, is an 
undischarged bankrupt, has contested a 
general election, was a member of parliament 
(either the House of Representative or the 
Senate) or was an office bearer of a political 
party for the preceding seven years.53 
This would rule out most significant Fijian 
leaders over the last decade. Bainimarama 
wants to depoliticise the GCC, but sees no 
contradiction in becoming its chair while 
occupying the highest political office in the 
land. What he will have at his command is 
a hand-picked GCC which will enable him 
to influence the appointment of President 
and Vice President. That, many believe, is 
his true motive in becoming the chair of the 
Great Council of Chiefs.
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COMMON ROLL
As 2007 came to an end, Bainimarama 
championed with renewed vigour his proposal 
to create a truly non-racial society. In his 
‘Road Map’ statement, Bainmarama talked of 
the need to ‘rid the Constitution of provisions 
that facilitate and exacerbate the politics of 
race’, and promised to appoint a Constitution 
Review Team to address this and other 
related issues. The team was not appointed – 
it had been overtaken by the National Council 
and the Peoples’ Charter – but Bainimarama 
continued to speak out in favour of non-racial 
politics. He proposed, for example, that all 
the 71 seats in the House of Representatives 
should be contested from non-racial common 
roll constituencies. It was a radical proposal, 
breathtaking in its audacity, and the first of its 
kind in post-independence Fiji from a Fijian. 
Bainimarama seemed adamant about it too. 
The common roll cause, which had once 
aroused such passionate debate in Fiji, had 
effectively died in 1969 with the death of its 
tireless advocate, AD Patel.54 Since then, 
every major political leader in Fiji – Fijian 
and Indo-Fijian alike – had accepted the 
‘reality’ of race as the driver of Fiji politics and 
worked within its broad parameters.
The proposal that the House of 
Representative seats should be contested 
from non-racial common roll constituencies 
drew a cautious response from SDL leader 
Laisenia Qarase. The 2007 census showed 
the indigenous Fijians comprising 57 per cent 
of the total population of 827,900 while the 
Indo-Fijian proportion had declined to 37 per 
cent. The projections are for further decline 
as Indo-Fijians emigrate and their birth rate 
remains low. Qarase, like many other Fijian 
leaders, sensed an advantage in the numbers, 
which explains his cautious, but encouraging 
support. Qarase is mistaken if he thinks that 
all Fijians will automatically vote for his party, 
though in the short run many might, as the 
interim administration continues to alienate 
sizeable sections of the Fijian community. 
Qarase’s willingness to consider a common 
electoral roll is predicated on his assumption 
of Fijian solidarity behind his party. 
For his part, Labour leader Mahendra 
Chaudhry has opposed, rhetorically at least, 
the race-based election system, although 
his stand on a complete common roll is 
not clear. He will be challenged by many 
in his own community who prefer racially 
reserved seats because of the illusion of 
security it gives them, having known no other 
system. The issue becomes more urgent 
for them as their numbers dwindle. Thus, 
it should come as no surprise if the once 
ardent champions of non-racialism embrace 
a racially compartmentalised system with 
guaranteed racial representation.
But at least on the face of it, the three 
principal leaders of Fiji – Qarase, Chaudhry 
and Bainimarama – are agreed on the need 
to move the country away from race-based 
politics, providing a basis for further dialogue 
between them. If there is disquiet about 
abandoning all the racially reserved seats in 
one clean sweep, the recommendations of 
the Reeves Commission (which reviewed the 
1990 constitution and made recommendations 
about its successor, the 1997 constitution) 
for a gradual abandonment of racially 
reserved seats might be worth considering. 
The Commission recommended that two 
thirds (46) of the 71 seats in the House of 
Representative should be contested from 
non-racial open seats and one third from 
racially-reserved ones, which would be 
jettisoned over time.
The evolving common ground on this issue 
notwithstanding, there are several obstacles. 
The first is Commodore Bainimarama’s 
complete unwillingness to engage with 
Qarase face-to-face on any issue except 
strictly on his own terms. On 16 November 
2007, Qarase wrote to Bainimarama, following 
earlier correspondence, seeking a meeting 
and suggesting a pathway out of the current 
impasse.55  Among his suggestions was that 
the interim administration continue running 
the affairs of the country until parliament is 
recalled. The recalled parliament would sit 
at most for two weeks (for the lower house 
and one of the Senate)  to deal with urgent 
business. Just before the recall of parliament 
the interim administration would resign, paving 
the way for a caretaker cabinet comprising 
members of the ousted Qarase government 
to run the country for the duration of the 
recalled parliament.  The prime minister 
would then resign and advise the president 
to dissolve the parliament, and a caretaker 
government would then take the country to 
the next general election. The proposal was 
sensible, if somewhat convoluted, and worth 
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serious consideration. As Qarase wrote, 
‘Given the will, and allocation of resources, 
there is no reason why the right of the 
people to choose their own Government 
should not be returned to them by the earlier 
date. We urge Commodore Bainimarama to 
show good will by aiming for this. Such an 
action would help to create a more positive 
and conciliatory national mood. It would find 
favour with the majority of the populace who 
back the SDL.’ 
Bainimarama informed the nation that, 
instead of pondering the matters Qarase had 
raised, he had thrown the letter straight into 
the rubbish bin. If Qarase wanted dialogue, he 
would have to embrace the Peoples’ Charter 
and raise his concerns there. Bainimarama’s 
visceral dislike – hatred might be a more 
apt word – of the ousted prime minister has 
shown no sign of diminishing. Bainimarama 
seems to believe in the old maxim that treating 
your adversary with respect is giving him an 
advantage to which he is not entitled. Even 
entitlements due to a former prime minister 
have been denied to Qarase – the country’s 
democratically elected leader for nearly six 
years – in what can only be called a petty 
act of petulant retribution, especially when 
Mahendra Chaudhry and Sitiveni Rabuka 
(and Tevita Momoedonu, who was prime 
minister for a few hours in 2000, enabling 
President Ratu Mara to dissolve parliament 
and call for fresh elections) received their 
prime ministerial privileges. 
Bainimarama insists that the next general 
elections, whenever they are held, will be 
under a non-racial voting system. But how 
will the new system be given constitutional 
legitimacy if it is not authorised by parliament? 
A decreed electoral system, without the 
imprimatur of parliament, will find favour with 
no one. Instead, it will cause further friction 
and division in Fiji. As the saying goes, it is 
better to debate a question without settling 
it, than to settle it without debate. But with 
the military insisting that its way is the only 
way, prospects of productive dialogue seem 
bleak.
There was a brief glimmer of hope in 
March 2008 when Commonwealth envoy 
and former chairman of the Fiji Constitution 
Review Commission, Sir Paul Reeves, 
visited Fiji to mediate between the different 
political leaders in an effort to break the 
political deadlock that Fiji found itself in. He 
had gone to Fiji at the invitation of Frank 
Bainimarama. At first the interim prime 
minister was welcoming, as were some 
of the other leaders, but he then changed 
his mind at the behest of the Military 
Council and cancelled further meetings 
with Reeves. Perhaps an important 
reason for Bainimarama’s change of mind 
might have been the position adopted by 
the Fiji Labour Party, which refused to 
participate in the discussions. ‘How can 
it [FLP] enter into a political dialogue with 
people whose legitimacy it is challenging?’ 
a party statement asked.56 The ousted SDL 
government had challenged the legality 
of the interim government in court. In any 
event, the consultations promised by the 
National Council for Building a Better Fiji 
was much broader and more inclusive 
and SDL and other parties could join the 
dialogue through it. On the face of it, FLP’s 
position seems disingenuous: after all, it 
had no difficulty lending support to Sitiveni 
Rabuka in 1992 while challenging the 
legitimacy of the constitution that brought 
him to power. Reeves wanted to explore 
ways of returning Fiji to early parliamentary 
democracy, while Labour wants to postpone 
the elections to beyond 2009, after the 
People’s Charter is in place. An important 
opportunity was missed.
If a week is a long time in politics, 
a year is an eternity. Fiji’s tale of woes 
continues. Many issues which precipitated 
the crisis and held the country to ransom 
remain unresolved. But if there is one thing 
certain amidst all the chaos and uncertainty 
confounding today’s Fiji, it is that the 
military is there to stay for the long haul. 
It wants for itself an entrenched position 
and role in the nation’s affairs. The military 
will no longer simply be an instrument of 
the state. It will be, as it desires to be, the 
ultimate authority overseeing the affairs of 
the state. A militarized democracy seems 
in the offing for Fiji. 
Despite all the provocation, there was 
no civil strife in Fiji. Fear of what the 
military might do has led to a prudent 
appreciation of the realities on the ground. 
After all, the military have all the guns, 
and their behaviour shows they mean 
business. More importantly, the prudent 
reactions of those sections of the Fijian 
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community most aggrieved by the coup 
have highlighted the serious leadership 
vacuum in the Fijian community.  Laisenia 
Qarase’s enforced exile on his remote island 
of Mavana in the Lau group deprived his 
supporters of a leader around whom they 
could rally. After returning to Suva, Qarase 
maintained a low profile, quietly consulting 
party colleagues about the impending court 
case and other related matters. He was 
being prudent: he had no choice. Most of 
his former parliamentary colleagues were 
silent, watching the unfolding events from 
the sidelines. There was polite protest in 
the newspapers, although most grumblings 
remained around the grog bowl. 
The Great Council of Chiefs reacted 
similarly to reforms in its internal structure 
and composition proposed by the interim 
administration. The determination to seek 
resolutions to the country’s problems within 
the legal and constitutional framework augurs 
well for Fiji, but too much should not be taken 
for granted. It was refreshing to see those 
who once decried democracy as a foreign 
flower unsuited to Fijian soil now publicly 
embracing democracy as the only way 
forward for Fiji. Such are the processes of 
political transformation in contemporary Fiji. 
But, as recent history has shown, perceptions 
and attitudes change fast in Fiji. Today’s 
self-proclaimed democrats could without 
too much contortion turn into tomorrow’s 
autocrats, with the roots of respect for the 
rule of law and constitutional processes 
remaining very shallow.
The December coup raised a host of 
questions about the kind of society Fiji is and, 
more importantly, aspires to be. What kind of 
political culture does it want to bequeath to 
future generations? Will the military, from now 
on, be an integral part of the political process, 
as in Turkey or Thailand or even Pakistan? 
What role will traditional institutions play in 
the modern political arena?  There were no 
answers to these questions in 2007. Much 
was promised, much less accomplished. 
Robert Rounds of Lautoka spoke for many 
when he wrote: ‘I am tired of the continued 
promises and fancy choice of words. Fiji 
needs leaders, we need our leaders to give 
us reason to believe that we will one day be 
‘the way the world should.’ Fancy words can 
only last so long. Leaders do not rule, they 
lead. Sadly no one is leading our Fiji.’ 57
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